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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the importance of competition in the growth and 
development of firms. We make use of the large-scale natural experiment of 
the shift from an economic system without competition to a market economy 
to shed light on the factors that influence innovation by firms and their 
subsequent growth. Our data come from a survey of nearly 4,000 firms in 24 
transition countries. These data have three main advantages. First, while in a 
market economy firms face widely divergent needs and opportunities for 
innovation, virtually every firm that emerged from central planning was 
maladapted to the new environment, and needed to innovate at least modestly 
in order to survive. Second, we measure directly the degree of competition 
perceived by each firm in its principal market rather than attempting to infer 
this from market data collected by statistical agencies; and we collect data 
directly on various measures of innovative activity. Third, the fact that 
transition countries inherited market structures from a regime in which 
selection and incentive effects of competition were not operational and were 
then subjected to a dramatic shock to competition mitigates some of the 
endogeneity problems associated with measures of competition in market 
economies. We find evidence of the importance of a minimum of rivalry in 
both innovation and growth: the presence of at least a few competitors is 
effective both directly and through improving the efficiency with which the 
rents from market power in product markets are utilised to undertake 
innovation. There is also some less clear-cut evidence that the presence of a 
few rivals is more conducive to performance than the presence of many 
competitors. 
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1. Introduction 
 
How much does competition matter for the growth and development of firms, 
and if it is significant, through what channels does it work? These are important and 
long-standing questions in economics, but ones to which convincing answers have 
been frustratingly difficult to find. Theories of the influence of competition on firm 
behaviour and performance suggest that this influence can work through many 
different channels, some of them mutually offsetting, so the question of their relative 
importance can only be settled empirically. However, there are many obstacles in the 
way of finding convincing empirical answers. These consist partly in the lack of 
appropriate data, notably concerning measures of the competitive pressure faced by 
firms. Proxies such as shares of administratively defined product markets identified 
by SIC codes may be a long way from identifying the true nature of economic 
competition. The obstacles consist partly also in the difficulty of identifying the 
appropriate counterfactual against which actual outcomes can be measured. When the 
degree of competition varies many other things typically vary as well, including 
technology and regulation, and it is not easy to see which of these variations should 
properly be considered exogenous to the economic processes under investigation. 
 
In this paper we present evidence that competition matters for firm innovation 
and growth. Specifically, we find evidence that firms facing just a few rivals perform 
better than those that face none; there is also some less clear-cut evidence that the 
presence of a few rivals is more conducive to performance than the presence of many 
competitors.  This is consistent with a broadly Schumpeterian view of the relationship 
between competition and performance (such as has begun attracting renewed 
theoretical interest in recent years).  
 
In the raw data presented in Fig. 1, there is a clear inverted-U relationship 
between firm growth and the number of competitors faced by the firm. Firms facing 
between one and three competitors had average sales growth of nearly 11% over the 
three years to 1999, while monopolists saw real sales decline by over 1% and firms 
facing more than three competitors had sales growth of under 2%.2 To investigate 
whether this bivariate correlation stands up to more rigorous econometric estimation 
is the task of this paper. We also explore in some detail the channels through which 
competition works, distinguishing between the effects of competition on managerial 
and work-force motivation, and its effects on the resources available to firms to put 
into practice their strategies of investment and innovation. We do so in two ways. 
First of all, we use two measures of competitive pressure, one being the number of 
rival firms perceived by the firm in its main market, and the other being the elasticity 
of demand the firm perceives for its products; these turn out to have distinct and 
largely independent influences on firm behaviour. In turn we look at this behaviour in 
two ways – through measures of the innovation activity undertaken by the firm, and 
through a measure of its growth in sales. These respond in distinct ways to the two 
kinds of competitive pressure just described.  
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
                                                           
2 The vertical lines are 95% confidence intervals from a simple least squares regression of log sales 
growth on three category dummies (monopolist, 1-3 competitors, >3 competitors) and no constant. 
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Figure 1: Average real sales growth by number of 
competitors (3,705 firms)
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Our evidence comes from a face-to-face survey of competition and innovation 
in nearly 4,000 firms in 24 transition countries conducted in 1999. This evidence 
offers a number of advantages over previous work. First of all, countries at the 
beginning of the transition from central planning to the market economy offer a 
historically unique opportunity to observe large numbers of firms simultaneously 
facing opportunities for innovation. In a market economy at any one time, the firms 
that we observe typically face widely divergent opportunities for innovation: it is 
therefore difficult to know to what extent variations in actual innovative activity are 
due to variations in responsiveness to opportunity, and to what extent they are due to 
variations in the opportunities themselves. For instance, firms that innovate relatively 
little in any one period may be relatively unresponsive to opportunity, or they may 
have undertaken innovation in earlier periods and already be occupying an optimal 
market niche. Conversely, firms that innovate more in any one period may be those 
that are responding rapidly to current opportunities, or those that are responding 
slowly to past opportunities. Of course, if the distribution of innovation opportunities 
were completely random, such differences would just add noise to the data without 
biasing the estimation. But there are many reasons to think that innovations cluster, 
and that in any period they will be more concentrated among firms of certain 
categories (of size and market position, for instance) than others. By contrast, the 
early years of the transition provide as close to a laboratory for responsiveness to 
innovation as we may ever come. Virtually every firm that emerged from central 
planning was maladapted to the new environment, and virtually every firm needed to 
innovate at least modestly in order to survive. 
 
 A second important advantage of the data we report here is that the survey is 
specifically designed to investigate the impact of competition on innovation and 
growth. It contains a number of questions that elicit from firms a much more intuitive 
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and economically-grounded view of their competitive circumstances than has 
previously been possibly in surveys on this scale. It also contains detailed questions 
about the innovative activities undertaken by managers. These provide us with the 
opportunity of investigating the impact of competition on innovation as the first step 
and then in the second step, looking at how competitive conditions influence output 
growth as distinct from their effect on innovation.  
 
The concern raised in many studies of the effects of competition on firm 
performance in mature market economies is that in the long run, successful 
performance brings with it an increase in market share and more market power. 
Reverse causality of this kind will put an upward bias on measures of market power in 
a performance regression. However, although our data and measures of growth and 
innovation cannot entirely eliminate such worries, they go a considerable way to 
mitigating them.  
 
Transition economies were subjected to a comprehensive economy-wide 
shock to competition. This shock had the effect of introducing competition between 
existing firms in an environment where there was previously none, of removing 
automatic state financial support thus creating the incentive for managers of existing 
firms to attend to competitive conditions (in domestic and export markets), of opening 
the way for the entry of new firms, and of introducing competition from imports. 
There are therefore two kinds of firms in the sample: ‘old’ firms that existed under the 
planned economy and either remain state-owned or are privatized and ‘new’ firms that 
had no predecessor in the pre-reform economy.   
 
Broadly speaking, the large, established firms in the sample are likely to 
operate in markets, the structure of which at the time of the survey is still strongly 
influenced by the pre-transition arrangements in which competitive success was not a 
determinant of market structure. The new firms making up the bulk of the sample are 
mainly small and more plausibly characterized as responding to market conditions 
than establishing them. Furthermore, since all new firms are relatively young 
(founded between 1990 and 1996), to the extent that there is some endogeneity of 
market structure it will affect them to a similar degree. As we shall see when we 
inspect the data, market power is much more characteristic of state-owned firms than 
of others: such firms had privileged access to resources in the old regime. At the time 
of the survey, transition economies were distant from an equilibrium in which market 
structure was the outcome of the playing out of competitive forces.  
 
For these reasons, transition economies observed at the time of this survey 
may constitute a closer approximation to a large-scale ‘natural experiment’ in which 
we can examine the effects of competition on behaviour and performance than we are 
ever likely to find again, at least on such a scale. Furthermore, by analyzing separately 
the way competition affects performance for the two sub-samples of new firms and 
established firms we may obtain a qualitative and quantitative indication of the 
changing character of market structure, which will assist us in interpreting the results 
for the sample as a whole.  
 
To summarize, two features of the transition context lessen concern about 
reverse causality between firm success and measures of competition: on the one hand, 
aspects of market structure and the competitive pressure faced by firms were inherited 
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from the command economy and on the other, for many firms, their competitive 
context is the outcome of random events during the liberalisation process early in the 
transition. 
 
Of course, one disadvantage of the natural experiment offered by transition is 
that a change in the degree of competition was only one of many changes to the 
economic environment. In particular, many countries implemented privatisation 
programmes, as well as changes in regulations affecting a large number of aspects of 
the business environment. All these countries have also been going through a 
profound social transformation that affects everything from the aspirations of 
entrepreneurs to perceptions of the socially acceptable level of corruption. In order to 
isolate the influence of competition, we control for a number of general features of 
firms and their external environment (e.g., their size, whether they existed under 
central planning or not, economic sector and location). Other elements of the 
institutional and policy environment will vary across countries and will be captured in 
the country dummies.  
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2 we review briefly the 
theoretical and empirical literature on the link between competition and growth – do 
we have any reason to expect there to be a link at all? In section 3 we describe our 
data, and in section 4 we discuss empirical specifications. Sections 5 and 6 present our 
results and section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Why should competition matter for innovation and for the growth of firms?  
 
Whilst there is a clear consensus in theoretical and empirical work that 
stronger competition improves allocative efficiency in most types of industries, the 
connection between competition and both innovation and growth is much more 
contentious. Schumpeter identified the countervailing pressures at work in 1943 and it 
is more than a half century later that theoretical work has been able to formalize the 
mechanisms he described and that best-practice empirical analysis has begun to find 
ways of separating out the effects in the data.  
 
Schumpeter’s vision of the capitalist economy was of a system in which 
incumbents with market power are constantly being threatened both by existing 
competitors and by new entrants (Schumpeter 1943, Carlin, Haskel and Seabright, 
2001). Innovation is spurred by the potential rents that would come from success in a 
necessarily risky activity and by the need to innovate to maintain existing rents in the 
face of competitive threat. He also emphasized that innovation is costly, that financial 
markets are imperfect and that internal funds are often necessary in order for a firm to 
innovate. This analysis suggests that on the one hand market power can boost 
innovation: higher rents enable more innovation to be undertaken (resources) and 
increase the rewards to such innovation as occurs (incentives), whilst on the other 
hand, more competition can also boost innovation: incumbents who fail to innovate 
will be pushed out by innovating incumbents or entrants. In his vision of how the 
competitive process works, these counteracting forces are simultaneously present. The 
subtlety of Schumpeter’s analysis does not therefore lend itself to a simple hypothesis 
such as ‘more competition raises/lowers innovation’ that can be taken to the data. His 
analysis distinguishes between actual rents (resources), perceived rents (post-
innovation), actual competition and potential competition.  
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Considerable progress has been made in recent years in building formal 
models in both industrial organization and in growth theory that capture several 
aspects of the Schumpeterian competitive process. A survey of models from both 
traditions is provided in Aghion and Griffith (2004). Taking incentive effects first, in 
addition to the classic Schumpeterian effect of greater ex post competition depressing 
the incentive to innovate (as in Aghion and Howitt 1998), other models have shown 
how the adverse effects of knowledge spillovers to competitors on the incentive to 
invest may offset the direct productivity-enhancing impact of the spillovers 
themselves (e.g. Dutta & Seabright, 2002). The opposite relationship with greater 
competition inducing productivity growth is captured in some models. For example, 
the emergence of new competitors threatens the temporary monopoly profits from 
innovation and the survival of incumbents, which prompts satisficing managers to 
exert effort and shorten the innovation cycle (Aghion, Dewatripont & Rey 1997). 
More recently, the basic Schumpeterian model has been extended by allowing 
incumbent firms to innovate (Aghion, Harris, Howitt & Vickers 2001). This produces 
an inverse-U shaped relationship between competition and innovation. At low levels 
of competition, the incentive to innovate is sharpened as more competition raises the 
incremental profits from innovation. When competition becomes intense, further 
competition may inhibit innovation as the standard Schumpeterian effect offsets the 
pressure to innovate so as to escape competition.  
 
Empirical support for the role of competition as a spur to performance comes 
from recent econometric research using a variety of performance measures. For 
instance, Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) use numbers of innovations as a 
measure and are able to reconcile the fact that large firms are more likely to innovate 
with the positive role of competition in innovation. They show both that firms with 
larger market shares have more to gain by innovating in a pre-emptive fashion 
(potential competitive threat) and that in industries where competition is less intense, 
rates of innovation are lower. The results are consistent with those of a quite different 
methodology (bench-marking using case studies) in which Baily and Gersbach (1995) 
find that “head-to-head” competition in the same market results in faster innovation in 
several manufacturing industries. Nickell (1996) controls for industry level 
concentration and import concentration and finds that a firm-level measure of 
competition is correlated with TFP growth. A robust inverse U-relationship between 
product market competition and the patenting activity of UK firms consistent with the 
counteracting Schumpeterian mechanisms set out in Aghion, Harris, Howitt & 
Vickers (2001) is reported in Aghion, Bloom, Blundell, Griffith & Howitt (2003).  
 
Evidence that only a few competitors is sufficient to sharpen incentives is 
provided in an empirical study of entry thresholds. Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) find 
that most of the competitive impact from entry comes from the first two entrants to 
challenge a monopolist, with the effect levelling out once market participants number 
around five.  
 
Nickell motivates his 1996 paper by observing that the most convincing 
evidence for the role of competition in innovation and growth comes from a ‘broad 
brush’ comparison between the lack of dynamism of centrally planned as compared 
with market economies (Nickell, 1996). Studies are beginning to emerge that examine 
the role of competition in the transition from central planning to the market economy. 
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Grosfeld and Tressel (2002) apply Nickell’s methodology to a panel of Polish firms 
listed on the stock market. They find that a reduction of 10 percentage points in the 
firm’s market share is associated with faster total factor productivity growth of 1.4 
percentage points. Using a measure of competition at industry level, Konings (1998) 
found in a study of Bulgaria and Estonia that more competitive pressure in the 
industry enhanced firm TFP growth in Bulgaria but not in Estonia. A recent attempt 
has been made to use the statistical technique of meta-analysis to synthesize the 
empirical results of over one hundred studies of transition economies (Djankov and 
Murrell, 2002). Although there are important questions about the reliability of meta-
analysis techniques, especially where there is reason to suspect that empirical biases 
may be correlated across studies,3 their findings are nevertheless illuminating. 
Djankov and Murrell (2002) pool 23 studies (using mainly level but with some growth 
rate measures) and report a positive impact of competition on performance (see Table 
7 in Djankov and Murrell for the estimated size of the effects). Finally, a study of 
Georgian firms (Djankov and Kreacic 1998) that collected information on actions 
taken by managers found that competition from foreign producers tended to be 
associated with employment cuts and changes in suppliers (but tended to reduce the 
likelihood of the disposal of assets, renovations and computerization). By contrast, 
firms with a larger market share were more likely to engage in computerization, 
introduce renovations, establish a new marketing department and dispose of assets. 
  
Naturally, all studies of the impact of competition need to control for other 
factors, and studies vary in the extent and manner in which they do so. One such 
factor is ownership. Since privately-owned firms also tend to operate in a different 
competitive environment, failure to control for ownership might lead to significant 
bias. Pooling 37 studies and placing more weight on studies that controlled for 
selection bias in the privatization process, Djankov and Murrell (2002) found that 
privatization improved performance significantly (the majority of studies used levels 
rather than growth rate measures, see Djankov and Murrell Table 2). For the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries (former Soviet Union), 
however, there was no robust significant difference between the performance of state-
owned and privatized firms.  
 
Bearing these findings in mind, as well as the fact that in our data it is 
impossible to take into account the endogeneity of the privatisation decision by 
correcting for selection bias, we do not distinguish separately between privatised 
firms and ones that were state-owned at the time of the survey. We can report, 
however, that this distinction proved insignificant in our preliminary work: any 
positive bias on the effect of privatization due to selection effects was not strong 
enough to produce a significant difference in performance between state-owned and 
privatized firms once competition, size and sector were controlled for. The relevant 
distinction in the data appears to be between old and new firms rather than between 
state-owned and private (i.e. privatized plus new) ones. This distinction also raises 
fewer econometric problems since the difference between old and new firms is given 
by history.  
 
 To summarise, theory provides good reasons to expect that monopolists will 
be less dynamic and innovative than rivalrous oligopolists, with a small number of 
                                                           
3 For a survey of the methodological problems associated with ‘narrative’ and meta-analysis reviews, 
see Chalmers and Altman (1995). 
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exceptions in naturally monopolistic industries. Empirical evidence tends to confirm 
this view. Both theory and evidence are less clear, however, as to whether competition 
has a monotonically beneficial effect on performance or whether many competitors 
are actually less good for performance than just a few. Theory and evidence also 
suggest that any attempt to test for such a relationship needs to control for firm and 
industry characteristics, as well as for relevant features of the external environment. 
 
 It is evident that the theories we have outlined above do not provide 
sufficiently precise empirical predictions for us to be able to distinguish one theory 
from another; instead they provide a guide as to certain empirical tendencies for 
which one can test (such as whether the effect of competition is monotonic). 
Nevertheless, we can tentatively draw a distinction between theories that appeal to the 
effect of competition on managerial incentives (on how keenly managers will wish to 
ensure the efficient use of the firm’s resources), and those that appeal to the effect of 
competition on the resources over which managers enjoy discretionary control. The 
former type of effect could well be non-monotonic: for firms in which monetary 
rewards for managers are weak, lack of rivalry may make managers lazy, while too 
much rivalry may make them resigned to their fate. Equally in profit-maximizing 
firms, the incentive to escape competition by innovating may be strong at low levels 
of competition but be offset by the standard Schumpeterian effect when competition is 
high, again producing an inverted U pattern. However, the effect of managerial 
resources is more likely to be monotonic, but to depend qualitatively on how well 
aligned are the incentives of the managers and the shareholders. Managers acting 
efficiently will tend to do more for the firm the more resources they have to play with, 
while those acting inefficiently will tend to do worse, the more resources they have to 
play with. We explore this suggestion further in the regressions we report in section 6 
below. Our data is ideal for this purpose since in the new post-reform competitive 
environment of transition countries, we have both old firms, which can be assumed to 
be characterized by relatively weak monetary incentives for managers, and new firms, 
where monetary incentives are strong. 
 
  
3. Data and Variables 
 
Our objective is to make use of a large multi-country cross-sectional firm-level 
data-set to examine the determinants of  innovation and growth at the level of the 
firm. Although there are serious shortcomings with the data that limit the analysis that 
can be undertaken, these are balanced by the opportunities afforded by bespoke data-
collection on this scale. The key disadvantages stem from the fact that there is no 
panel structure and that the data is self-reported rather than of an accounting or 
administrative nature. On the other hand, information collected from firms of all sizes 
across all sectors in a large number of economies following a major shock to the 
competitive environment is a potentially rich source of evidence to complement the 
insights from more conventional data-sets.   
 
We discuss the nature of the survey and the data collected and then in turn the 
issues raised by the measurement of growth, innovation and competition.  
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The BEEPS enterprise survey 
 
A major effort at the collection of firm-level data on enterprise performance 
and the external environment of firms in transition economies was undertaken in 1999 
by the EBRD and World Bank. Face-to-face interviews at enterprises in twenty 
transition countries were conducted in the early summer of 1999. Surveys of five 
more transition countries were completed later in 1999. The aim was to investigate 
how enterprise restructuring behaviour and performance were related to competitive 
pressure, the quality of the business environment, and the relationship between 
enterprises and the state.  
 
The survey sample was designed to be broadly representative of the population 
of the firms according to their economic significance, sector, size and geographical 
location within each country. The sectoral composition of the total sample in each 
country in terms of agriculture, industry and services was determined by their relative 
contribution to GDP after allowing certain excluded sectors. Firms that operated in 
sectors subject to government price regulation and prudential supervision were 
excluded from the sample. Within each sector, the sample was designed to be as 
representative as possible of the population of firms subject to various minimum 
quotas for the total sample in each country. This approach sought to achieve a 
representative cross-section of firms while ensuring sufficient weight in the tails of 
the distribution of firms for key control parameters (size, geographical location, 
exports, and ownership).  
 
The survey was implemented on behalf of the EBRD and World Bank by AC 
Nielsen through face-to-face interviews with each of the respondents in their local 
language (see Appendix). They were informed that the EBRD and World Bank had 
commissioned the survey and that the identity of the survey respondents was to be 
kept strictly confidential by the survey firm. The interviewers assured respondents 
that their identity would not be disclosed either to the two sponsoring institutions or to 
the government. In order to collect evidence on the role of competition in growth and 
restructuring, we designed a block of questions to be included in the BEEPS survey.   
 
The full sample size was 3,954 firms. The survey included approximately 125 
firms from each of the 24 countries, with larger samples in Poland and Ukraine (over 
200 firms) and in Russia (over 500 firms). We omit from the analysis firms missing 
any of the most basic indicators (industry, size classification, ownership classification, 
sales growth and employment growth) leaving us with a sample of 3,837 firms.  The 
econometric analysis in the next section removes all firms with missing values in any 
variable in use, reducing the sample to between 3,288 and 3,448 firms.  
 
Just over half the firms in the sample were newly-established private firms, 
32% were privatized and 16% remained in state ownership at the time of the survey. 
Table 1 provides some basic information on the distribution by size, sector and region 
of the sample of firms. The sample is dominated by small and medium-sized 
enterprises; one-half the sampled firms employed fewer than 50 persons, and just over 
one-fifth employed more than 200. Nearly one half of firms are from the service 
sector and 12% are from agriculture. 30% of firms are from the manufacturing sector. 
Just under one-third of the sample is from the Central and Eastern European region 
(including the Baltics) and nearly 10% of firms are Russian. Most firms were located 
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in either large cities or national capitals (36%) or in medium-sized cities (32%), with 
the remaining 32% in towns and rural areas.  
 
 [Table 1 here] 
 
The measurement of performance: growth and innovation 
 
Table 2 presents data on the average performance by firms using the 
performance measures that we concentrate on in this paper: the growth of real sales, 
of real sales per worker and the engagement of firms in innovation activities. The 
growth measures were calculated from self-reported figures for the real growth of 
sales and of employment over the previous three years. It is important to note that 
there is no true time-series dimension. We have only self-reported information on the 
change in real sales as well as on the kinds of restructuring activities carried out by 
the firms over the preceding three years. We need to keep these limitations in mind 
when analyzing the results. 
 
In the sample as a whole, 32% of firms reported a contraction in sales (in real 
terms) over the previous three years; just under one-quarter reported flat sales and just 
over 44% reported growing sales. The Central and Eastern European region including 
the Baltic States (CEB) and the South East European region (SEE) were the only 
regions in which more than one half of firms reported growing sales. In line with the 
macroeconomic performance across different regions, the proportion of firms with 
shrinking sales in a region ranged from just over one-fifth in CEB to one-third in 
Russia and 40% in the Western and Southern CIS.  
 
For old firms (state-owned and privatized), average growth of sales was 
negative; it was positive for new firms. The opposite was true of productivity growth: 
average growth of sales per worker was negative in new firms and positive in old 
ones. For both privatized and new private firms, average growth increased with the 
size of the firm. This was not the case for state firms. In old firms, where between 55 
and 60% of firms had declining sales, the more rapid shedding of labour than 
reduction of output lies behind the positive productivity growth recorded. In new 
firms, average productivity growth was negative but there is a clear size effect: as we 
move to higher size classes, productivity growth becomes less negative. In the largest 
size class, positive productivity growth was recorded for new firms. A possible 
explanation for this size effect is the endogeneity of size. Larger firms may be larger 
at the time of survey because they grew faster (or shrank less rapidly); we return to 
this issue in the next section when we discuss our econometric estimations. 
 
In addition to measures of performance based on sales growth, we sought to 
uncover the steps undertaken by firms to improve their performance through 
innovation.4 To capture the extent of their innovative activities, firms were asked 
questions about whether they had developed a new product line or upgraded an 
existing one, whether they had opened a new plant, and whether they had obtained 
ISO9000 quality accreditation in the previous three years. Table 2 shows that 40% of 
all firms upgraded at least one product, 30% introduced a new product, 20% opened a 
                                                           
4 Patterns of cost-oriented or defensive restructuring are explored in Carlin, Fries, Seabright and 
Schaffer (2001). 
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new plant and 15% obtained ISO9000 quality accreditation. Engagement in these 
activities was common across all firm types, including state-owned firms.  
 
The innovation variable used in our estimations is constructed using the 
method of principal components analysis from responses to the questions described 
above.5  For our innovation measure r we used responses to the four restructuring 
questions. The first of the four components explains 44% of the total variation, more 
than double that of the second component. The introduction of a new product or 
upgrading an existing one are given the largest weights in the construction of the 
index. The index is normalized so that the minimum value is zero and the maximum 
value is the number of possible restructuring measures. This is done to facilitate 
interpretation of the regression results – a unit increase in the index corresponds, 
roughly speaking, to the introduction of another restructuring measure. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
 
The measurement of competition 
 
One common and intuitive starting point for measuring competition is the 
extent to which production is concentrated in the hands of a few firms. The crudest 
measure of this concentration is simply the number of firms that are operating in the 
same or a recognisably similar market. To be useful this measure depends on there 
being some practical method of defining the relevant market (see Neven et.al., 1993, 
chapter 2), which essentially means finding goods and services that are reasonably 
close substitutes for each other while being distant substitutes for all other goods or 
services.  But while this may be a useful first indicator, it may be seriously misleading 
when there are important differences in size, strength and productivity between firms. 
For example, the exit of one large firm and entry of many small ones may reduce 
conventionally measured concentration but lower the vigour of the rivalry faced by 
the remaining large firms. This problem has been observed in transition countries 
where the exit of one or two large enterprises from an industry along with the 
simultaneous entry of many new small firms has resulted in a reduction in effective 
competition (see Kattuman and  Domanski, 1998 on Poland). One way of dealing with 
this is by calculating measures of market power at the firm rather than the market 
level, in particular by looking directly at the market share of each individual firm or 
by asking managers to provide a judgement as to the number of competitors they 
believe the firm faces in its main market.  
 
A second way of measuring competition is to look at some of the 
consequences of market structure rather than market structure itself, and specifically 
at the freedom firms have to choose prices (and other business strategies) 
independently of any concern about losing business to other firms. A natural way to 
do this is to estimate the so-called residual elasticity of demand for the firm’s own 
products, namely the extent to which a price rise by the firm would lead customers to 
                                                           
5 The use of these summary measures is more conservative than the alternative of including all the 
individual components as explanatory variables in the various regressions.  With so many regressors, a 
likely outcome of this alternative procedure is a finding that some regressors are significant and with 
the expected sign, some are insignificant, and some are significant but with the opposite of the expected 
sign, making it difficult to reach an overall interpretation of the results. 
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substitute away, either to rival firms or away from the product altogether. When 
sophisticated data are available, this elasticity can sometimes be estimated 
econometrically (see Hausman et.al., 1992, for an application to the case of beer), and 
it is particularly useful to do so when products are differentiated so that the notion of a 
single product market may make little sense.  
 
A third and altogether different approach to measuring competition is to look 
directly at the behaviour of firms and to infer from this the extent of the rivalry they 
believe themselves to face. In particular, the price-cost margin charged by a profit-
maximising firm facing constant marginal costs (given by the technology and not 
capable of being influenced by the firm itself) will be inversely proportional to the 
own-price elasticity of demand for its products. If price-cost margins can be reliably 
measured, therefore, they may themselves be an inverse indicator of the vigour of 
competition in the market. 
 
The survey instrument was expressly designed to discover the extent to which 
firms believed themselves to be facing significant competitive challenge using each of 
these kinds of measures.  
• As a measure of market structure we use the number of competitors reported 
by the respondent in the market for its main product, dividing firms into those 
reporting respectively no competitors, between one and three competitors and 
more than three competitors. Note that although this looks like a simple 
market concentration measure, it measures concentration in what the firm 
believes to be its main market, rather than the administrative category of 
products the firm is placed in by the national statistical agency. In particular, 
in a survey with coverage of the entire economy, this is likely to provide an 
economically meaningful measure of competition whether the firm is a pizza 
parlour or a components supplier for a multinational company. 
• As a measure of firms’ freedom to raise prices we use their response to a 
question asking them what would be the consequence of a 10% rise in the real 
price of their product relative to that of their competitors, scoring from one 
(for firms reporting that most customers would switch to rival suppliers) to 
four (for firms reporting that most customers would continue to buy in similar 
quantities as previously).  
• As a measure of firms’ behaviour we use their (self-reported) price-cost 
margin. 
 
We can ask two questions about these different ways of measuring 
competition. First, are they empirically consistent one another, in the sense that they 
identify the same firms as possessing market power? And secondly, are they just 
alternative empirical proxies for the same phenomenon, or do they measure distinct 
aspects of market power? To answer the first question, we report in Table 3 mean 
values of the second and third measure for firms categorised by the first measure, and 
sub-categorised by ownership status (state firm, privatised firm and other) in order to 
control for different degrees of commitment to profit-maximising behaviour. The 
answers clearly indicate that in markets with no competitors firms report lower own-
price elasticities of demand and higher price-cost margins than in markets with 1-3 
competitors. The exception is for state firms, where the price-cost margin is lower for 
firms facing 1-3 competitors than for either of the other categories (as one might 
expect given their weaker incentives for profit-maximisation). It appears that the 
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responses to these three questions complement one another, which is reassuring in 
terms of the economic content of the data. The questions asked about the number of 
competitors appear to have focused the attention of managers on an economically 
relevant concept of the ‘market’ in which they are competing. Nevertheless, the 
somewhat counter-intuitive behaviour of the price-cost margin for state firms leads us 
to prefer not to use this as an indicator of market power in the regressions below. 
 
 [Table 3 here]  
 
 To answer the second question (about whether these measure distinct aspects 
of market power) we shall investigate in detail the ways in which they interact with 
our measures of performance; we do so in section 6 below. However, we can make 
some general empirical predictions at this stage. First, if these measures were just 
imperfect proxies for the same basic phenomenon (‘market power’) we would expect 
that each of them would have a stronger impact when entered singly in a performance 
regression than when entered in the presence of the other (that is, entering a second 
measure would reduce the explanatory power of the first). In fact, as we shall see, the 
explanatory power of the measures appears to be more or less unchanged whether 
entered singly or together, which suggests that they may be identifying distinct 
aspects of market power.  
 
 So what might these distinct aspects of market power be? We distinguished 
above between theories that appeal to the effect of competition on managerial 
incentives, and those that appeal to the effect of competition on the resources over 
which managers enjoy discretionary control. It seems reasonable to suggest that the 
perceived number of competitors is likely to capture the motivation of managers, 
while the freedom to raise prices will capture their control over resources (the rents 
available to them). This prompts a second empirical prediction: if motivation is 
strongest when there are 1-3 competitors and weakest when there are none, then more 
resources should be associated with better performance when there are 1-3 
competitors and not associated (or negatively associated) when there are none.  
 
Finally, the survey also sought to investigate the impact of perceived 
competitive pressure on decisions by managers to undertake restructuring measures 
(rated in each case on a scale of 1=not important to 4=very important). The questions 
about pressure to innovate are important since they enable us to explore more closely 
how performance improvements come about. A smaller proportion of state firms as 
compared with other firms reported pressure from domestic competitors as playing a 
significant role in their decision to enter new markets or introduce new products. 
Amongst private firms, one in five reported pressures from foreign competitors as 
significant in stimulating the introduction of new products. New entrants reported less 
pressure from foreign competition, which may reflect their small average size. 
 
 
4. Econometric estimation and modelling strategy 
 
Our model consists of two structural equations, one for innovation and the 
second for sales growth, in which we include innovation and the growth of 
employment, along with other regressors. The second equation may be interpreted as 
one version of an augmented total factor productivity growth equation. We do not 
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have a measure of the growth of the capital stock but our innovation/restructuring 
measure includes information on the opening of new plants. 
 
The determinants of innovation are the following: 
- Product market competition.  
- Market growth.  
- Access to resources. 
- Managerial incentives.  
- Size of firm. 
- Controls for industry (innovation opportunities vary by sector), location (to 
account for agglomeration effects) and country. 
 
The determinants of sales growth are the following: 
- Growth of employment 
- Innovation 
- Product market competition.  
- Access to resources. 
- Managerial incentives.  
- Controls for industry, location and country. 
 
Before specifying the estimating equations, issues of identification must be 
addressed in conjunction with data availability. There is a set of variables that 
theoretical considerations suggest should be in the innovation/restructuring equation 
but not in the growth equation and vice versa. Variables that on a priori grounds 
should be excluded from the growth equation are the so-called pressure variables that 
reflect the view of managers as to the importance of different sources of pressure for 
their decision to undertake restructuring. Sources of competitive pressure were 
‘domestic’ or ‘foreign’ competitors. In addition, managers were asked about the role 
of pressure from customers, which we use as a proxy for the growth of the market. 
This allows us to exclude sales growth from the innovation equation. The ‘pressure’ 
variables are instruments for innovation in the growth equation, the validity of which 
can be tested. The size of firm is a standard determinant of innovation (reflecting, for 
example, economies of scale in R&D and marketing) but it is less clear that it has a 
place in a TFP growth equation. We test whether size is a valid instrument in the 
growth equation. 
 
Conversely, on a priori grounds, employment growth should be in the growth 
equation but not in the innovation equation. Since inputs and output may be chosen 
simultaneously, the possible endogeneity of employment growth in the growth 
equation must be addressed. Suitable instruments are difficult to find in the survey 
data so we take two alternative strategies to deal with this. The first is to experiment 
with an instrument for employment constructed by interacting the country dummies 
with an exogenous determinant of performance at the level of firm (we use one of the 
competition measures). The logic of the choice of the country-competition interaction 
variable is that there is country variation in policies to downsize firms (by adjusting 
employment).6  We refer to these as country-competition interaction effects. 
                                                           
6 The approach is analogous to the approach adopted in Angrist and Krueger’s (1991) study of the 
returns to education.  They estimated earnings equations for a sample of American males in which 
years of education was an endogenous regressor and dummies for year and state of birth were 
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Unfortunately diagnostic tests reveal these instruments to be rather weak, so an 
alternative strategy we use is to impose a range of coefficients on employment growth 
(from 0.25 to 1) and examine the sensitivity of the other coefficients to this variation. 
Using a coefficient of one is equivalent to estimating a labour productivity growth 
equation.  
 
As discussed above we interpret the 10% price test variable as capturing the 
extent to which managers have discretionary control over resources, and the number 
of competitors variable, as well as the distinction between old and new firms, as 
capturing managerial incentives. We report separate estimations for new and old firms 
as well as pooled estimations 
 
We therefore estimate equation (1) for innovation  
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and equation (2) for growth 
 
2543210 bbbbbb unewrlmpowercompy +++++++= 6Xb     (2) 
 
where comp measures the number of competitors, mpower, market power (the 10% 
price test), pressureD and pressureF measure the pressure on firms to innovate from 
respectively domestic and foreign competitors, pressureC measures pressure from 
customers,  new is a dummy denoting the difference between new and old firms and 
size measure the employment in the firm. The controls for sector and location are 
denoted by the vector X. In the growth equation, y is the growth of output and l is 
employment growth. Country fixed effects are included in all regressions. 
 
For the a priori reasons discussed earlier, we take the measures of competition 
as exogenous to the performance outcomes; the distinction between new and old firms 
is also exogenous and we assume that sector and location are exogenous. However, by 
splitting the sample between old and new firms, we explore further the possibility that 
for new firms there may be reverse causality from a recent decision to innovate to its 
perception of the number of its near competitors.  
 
We are able to deal with the endogeneity of size in a straightforward way. As 
noted earlier, there may be a spurious correlation between performance as measured 
over the preceding three years and size as measured at the time of survey, because 
ceteris paribus firms that grew during the period will tend to be larger at the end of 
the period.  We therefore use average employment during the period as our size 
measure calculated from observed end-period employment7 and employment growth 
during the period (both in logs).8   
                                                                                                                                                                      
exogenous regressors.  Angrist and Krueger created instruments for years of education by interacting 
quarter-of-birth with state-of-birth and quarter-of-birth with year-of-birth. 
7 Firms report employment by choosing 1 of 6 size categories; our end-period “log employment” is the 
log of the midpoint of the reported category. 
8 We note that when the sales growth equation is re-estimated using end-period size, it is positive and 
highly significant.  In the results reported below using average-period size, it is statistically 
insignificant. 
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Estimation methods and diagnostic tests 
 
For the instrumental variables estimations we employ several diagnostic tests. 
Our benchmark regression is a two-step efficient GMM chosen because it is efficient 
in the presence of arbitrary heteroskedasticity, which tests suggest is present.9  When 
there is only one endogenous regressor, we report an F-test of the excluded 
instruments in the first-stage regression.  
 
We also present a test of overidentifying restrictions, namely the Hansen J 
statistic. This is a test of the joint hypothesis that the instruments are valid (i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term) and that none of the instruments should have been 
included in the set of regressors and were not. All estimations were done using the 
Stata statistical package.10 
 
 
 
5. Results 
 
Before estimating the structural equations, we complete the data description by 
estimating a reduced form equation for sales growth with only the exogenous 
variables present (as shown in equation (3)). The results constitute our initial check of 
the bivariate correlation of growth with intense rivalry in the product market 
illustrated in Fig. 1. 
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We also estimate two “semi-reduced” forms which include employment growth, one 
instrumented and one with an imposed coefficient of unity; however, both estimations 
include the exogenous determinants of innovation but exclude innovation itself. The 
equation with an imposed employment growth coefficient of unity is in effect 
estimating the determinants of labour productivity – and so, given the high estimated 
labour elasticity of over 0.9, is the instrumented estimation; our interpretation below 
uses this terminology. 
 
 
Reduced and semi-reduced form estimation 
 
The results of reduced and semi-reduced form estimations of the sales growth 
indicator on the exogenous variables are shown in Table 4. When interpreting the 
results, it is important to recall that the average growth of sales and of productivity of 
                                                           
9 We also estimated the modification of limited-information maximum likelihood (LIML) proposed by 
Fuller (1977); we set the Fuller parameter α=1, giving us the mean-unbiased version of his estimator. 
The main motivation for the use of LIML is that recent research suggests it performs relatively well 
when instruments are weak, which is the case when we treat employment as endogenous.  We do not 
report these results since they were qualitatively identical to the GMM results. 
10 For further details of the estimation routines used, see Baum, Stillman and Schaffer (2003). 
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firms was close to zero and only just over 40% of firms reported positive sales growth 
over the preceding three years. The findings are striking.  
 
[Table 4 here] 
 
The nature of competition in the product market has important effects on the 
performance of firms in all of these specifications. There are indications of a non-
monotonic (‘inverse-U’) relationship with performance. Sales and productivity growth 
were higher in firms facing between one and three competitors in the market for their 
main product than in firms that either faced no competition at all or that faced more 
than three competitors. The positive effect of an intermediate degree of product 
market competition is economically as well as statistically significant. Firms facing 
between one and three competitors reported growth in sales and productivity about 
10% higher than other firms. Firms reporting more than three competitors have a little 
over 4% higher growth than monopolists, although this difference is not statistically 
significant. However, the difference between the growth of firms facing one to three 
competitors and those facing more than three is significant at 5% in all specifications, 
indicating that the inverse-U relation is statistically significant in all the reduced-form 
estimations. As we shall see, it is not always statistically significant in the structural 
equations capturing the separate component effects, but such an inverse-U is certainly 
a robust descriptive property of the total impact of product market competition.  
 
The second indication that competition effects are important comes from the 
positive sign on the variable for firms reporting that sales would fall only slightly or 
not at all in response to a 10% price rise. These firms saw productivity growth 
between 5% and 13.5% higher than others depending on the specification.  
 
Thirdly, although the competitive pressure variables are insignificant in the 
reduced forms for productivity growth, foreign competitors and more weakly, 
customers boost sales growth. We shall see that they are both important in the 
innovation equation, to which we now turn. 
 
Controlling for other factors, new firms have significantly higher sales growth 
than old firms, but lower productivity growth. The weaker productivity growth of new 
entrants is likely to indicate that such firms were attracting labour faster than their 
sales were growing. We investigate this further below. Size is positive in both 
equations, the control variables are not significant and country fixed effects are highly 
significant. We now explore in more detail the channels by which competition effects 
appear to be working by turning to the structural equations. 
 
 
Innovation  
 
The results for the innovation equation are shown in Table 5. Column (2) is 
identical to column (1) except that a single indicator has been used for each of the 
pressure variables. This does not affect the results. We note that although pressure 
from domestic competitors was included in the initial estimation of this equation, it 
proved insignificant; we also tested whether it was a valid instrument for innovation 
in the growth equation but it failed the instrument validity test. It is therefore dropped 
from the equation. 
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Columns (3) and (4) report estimates separately for the sub-samples of old 
firms and new firms. Although many of the coefficients are remarkably similar for the 
two samples, the effect of the number of competitors is strikingly different. Old firms 
display the inverted-U form (the coefficient on 1-3 competitors being significant at 
6%), but new firms show a monotonically decreasing impact of the number of 
competitors on innovation. 
 
We draw the following conclusions from the results for the innovation equation 
shown in Table 4:  
 
• The number of competitors is a (weakly) significant positive determinant of the 
decision to innovate only for old firms (and although there is a hint of an inverse-
U, it is not significant at conventional levels). This is consistent with the impact of 
competitive pressure in raising the incentives of managers of old firms to exert 
more effort and innovate. For new firms, the number of competitors is negatively 
related to innovation. This may be due, as we suggested above, to the more likely 
endogeneity of market structure for new firms – those that have successfully 
innovated view themselves as having fewer competitors as a result.  
• The ability to raise prices as measured by the 10% test is an important positive 
determinant of innovation, but so is pressure from foreign competitors. As noted 
above, pressure from domestic competitors was insignificant. One interpretation 
of this is that domestic and foreign competition are only imperfect substitutes.  
• The positive role of market power in innovation – controlling for both the number 
of competitors and for the pressure from competitors in the decision to innovate – 
is suggestive that firms face resource constraints. Rents are needed to finance 
innovation.  
• Pressure from customers is a significant determinant of innovation, which we 
interpret as capturing the importance of market growth for innovation. 
• New firms are more likely to engage in innovation, which supports the hypothesis 
that managerial incentives play a role.   
• Larger firms and those in big cities are much more likely to have engaged in 
innovation, which is in line with other empirical evidence and suggests that 
economies of scale in innovation and agglomeration effects are at work in the 
transition economies. 
• Predictable industry effects are confirmed: firms in the service and agricultural 
sectors are much less likely to have engaged in new product restructuring.  
 
 [Table 5 here]  
  
 
Growth 
 
 We look now at the determinants of growth using the estimates of the 
structural equation (2). Employment growth and innovation are highly significant 
determinants in the growth equation, which suggests that the equation be interpreted 
as a form of augmented TFP growth equation. Table 6 shows the results of 
estimations in which we instrument for innovation. Diagnostic tests on regressions in 
which both employment and innovation were treated as endogenous revealed a 
problem of weak instruments, which is not present when only innovation is 
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instrumented. Since we are not directly interested in the size of the coefficient on 
employment growth, we therefore treat employment growth as exogenous and 
examine in Table 7 below the sensitivity of the resulting parameter estimates to 
variations in imposed employment growth coefficients as discussed above.  
 
 Column (1) of Table 6 presents the OLS estimates of the growth equation. 
Columns (2) and (3) present the instrumental variables estimates. The excluded 
instruments are the ‘pressure to innovate’ variables and size. The really important 
feature to emerge from this table is that, for new firms, having between one and three 
competitors contributes positively and significantly to productivity growth in a direct 
way, even when the role of innovation is taken into account. Conditional on 
innovation (which as we have indicated may have an influence on its own on market 
structure), the presence of rivalry seems to matter for these firms. For old firms by 
contrast, rivalry matters through its impact on innovation. Market power as measured 
by the own-price elasticity of demand appears to work partly indirectly, via promoting 
innovation and partly directly as indicated by its continued significance in the growth 
regressions.11 
 
The only other variable that is consistently significant is the dummy for 
agriculture. Agriculture attracts a significant negative coefficient in the innovation 
equation. In the growth regression, it is positive, which indicates that residual 
productivity growth in firms in agriculture is high relative to firms in other sectors. 
The other control variables are important for innovation – and therefore indirectly for 
growth – but play no role in explaining residual productivity growth.  
 
New firms undertake more innovation but there is no consistent sign on new 
firms in the growth equations. As we shall see below, this reflects the way that 
employment growth is modelled.  
 
[Table 6 here] 
 
 The diagnostic tests of the instruments for innovation are quite satisfactory, 
with the F-tests of the excluded instruments in the first stage regression ranging from 
11 (for new firms only) to over 30 (for the total sample). The overidentification tests 
are also comfortably passed in each specification, which indicates that it is correct to 
exclude the ‘pressure’ and size variables from the growth equation.  
 
Since we cannot be fully confident that our estimation of the productivity 
growth equation has dealt satisfactorily with the endogeneity of employment growth, 
we experiment with a range of values of the employment growth elasticity and 
explore the implications for how the growth equation behaves. The results for 
coefficients ranging from 1 (which makes the growth equation a labour productivity 
growth equation) to a coefficient of 0.25 are shown in Table 7. The key competition 
results discussed in connection with Table 6 remain in place, which is reassuring.  
 
This experiment provides some additional insight into forces behind the 
growth of new as compared with old firms. We have seen that new firms do 
                                                           
11 Concern about the bias on TFP level estimates in the context of imperfect competition in the product 
market (Hall 1988) is mitigated by the fact that we are looking at the impact of a given level of 
competition on productivity growth. 
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significantly more innovation than do old ones. We note that, in the structural 
equation for growth in Table 7, as the coefficient on employment growth is reduced 
from one, the coefficient on new firms begins as negative and significant (as in the 
reduced form labour productivity growth equation), is insignificant when the 
coefficient on employment growth is 0.5 and becomes positive and significant when 
the coefficient is reduced to 0.25.  
 
How can we interpret this? Our prior is that new private firms get more of 
their growth from labour growth and less from capital deepening than is the case for 
old firms. In our augmented TFP-like growth equation we do not have capital growth, 
but instead we have our measure of innovation. Although some capital deepening will 
be captured in the innovation variable (specifically, the opening of a new plant) some 
will be in the productivity growth residual. When the employment growth elasticity is 
assumed to be large, then the rapid labour growth of new private firms explains a lot 
of sales growth and innovation explains some of what is attributable to capital growth. 
In this scenario, the dummy for new private firms takes on the character of a dummy 
for slow capital deepening and therefore attracts a negative coefficient. Conversely, 
when the coefficient on employment growth is constrained to be small (0.25 or indeed 
zero as in the column (1) of Table 4), the rapid labour growth of the new private firms 
is allowed to explain little of their growth, with the consequence that the dummy for 
the new firms captures this instead and turns positive.  
 
[Table 7 here] 
 
6.  The interaction between managerial motivation and resources 
 
In this section we explore the interaction between the number of competitors 
faced by a firm and its market power as measured by the freedom to raise prices. We 
suggested above that the former might work primarily through influencing the 
motivation of managers, and the latter through influencing the resources over which 
they have discretionary control. Table 8 provides evidence which clearly corroborates 
this suggestion. It reports the results of variants of the regression for innovation. 
Column (1) repeats for comparative purposes the basic equation reported in Table 5, 
with the minor modification that the market power variable is entered in cardinal 
rather than categorical form. This is motivated by the clarity it lends to the experiment 
we focus on here. Columns (2) and (3) exclude respectively the market power (10% 
test) and number of competitors variable. This also has almost no effect on the results, 
which strengthens our belief that these measures may be capturing distinct aspects of 
market power rather than being alternative imperfect measures of the same 
phenomenon. The same finding holds true in the growth equation, although we do not 
report this result explicitly. 
 
Column (4) reports the result of interacting the number of competitors with the 
market power (10% test) variable. The results are striking. Firms facing no 
competitors do no more innovation when they have market power than when they do 
not. Firms with 1-3 competitors, on the other hand, do more innovation when they 
have market power than when they do not. So do firms with more than three 
competitors. Both the latter two coefficients are significantly different from the first 
coefficient at 10% levels, though they are not significantly different from each other. 
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In the growth equations, by contrast, there is no significant interaction between the 
number of competitors and the freedom to raise prices, though once again we do not 
report these results explicitly. 
 
 These results provide suggestive, though not conclusive, evidence that our 
measures of numbers of competitors and of the freedom to raise prices are indeed 
measuring distinct facets of a firm’s market power, rather than being imperfect 
proxies for one single phenomenon. It seems plausible to suggest that the former 
represents the motivation of managers while the latter captures the resources over 
which they have discretionary control. Pursuing this hypothesis further seems to us a 
fruitful subject for further research. 
 
 
7.  Concluding remarks 
 
The chief finding of this study is the power of competition in influencing 
innovation and growth. In the innovation equation, the presence of some market 
power together with competitive pressure from foreign suppliers, strongly and 
robustly enhances performance, though in ways that differ interestingly and intuitively 
between old and new firms. Furthermore, it appears that the presence of at least some 
rivalry in the market is important not just in its own right but because it ensures that 
the resources available to a firm from any market power it enjoys are efficiently used. 
In the productivity growth equation (where we control for innovation as well as for 
employment growth), innovation matters strongly for growth but there is an additional 
effect of competition, indicating that intense rivalry in the product market raises 
residual productivity growth. The effect is stronger for new firms than for old ones, 
for whom the competition impact works more strongly through innovation. There is 
also some evidence that the effect is stronger for limited rivalry (one to three 
competitors) than for more than three competitors – the inverse-U relation. The 
difference is not consistently significant at conventional levels in the structural 
equations, though it is significant in all the reduced-form specifications. This means 
that we can be more confident that an inverse-U relation of some sort characterizes 
the link between competition and growth than about the channels through which such 
a relation might operate. 
 
Although we have made a start in examining the channels through which these 
competitive pressures work, notably by distinguishing between factors influencing 
managerial incentives and those influencing the resources under managers’ 
discretionary control, it is not possible on the evidence we have to distinguish more 
precisely between alternative hypotheses about the mechanisms at work. However, 
these findings are certainly consistent with the presence of a Schumpeterian-type 
competitive process, albeit one accompanied by considerable disruption and 
turbulence (see Carlin, Haskel and Seabright, 2001). Consistently also with the 
findings of Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), this evidence suggests that it is the presence 
of a minimum number of seriously competing firms that generates competitive 
conduct. And retained profits – in the presence of competitive pressure – appear also 
to be important for financing the restructuring that helps firms to succeed.  
 
We have also been able to show that new private firms are more heavily 
engaged in innovation than are firms that pre-existed the reforms. Light was thrown 
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on the paradox of the significantly better performance of new firms on innovation but 
their apparently weaker labour productivity growth performance by experimenting 
with different elasticities on employment growth. New firms appear to rely 
systematically more on labour than on capital-deepening growth in expanding their 
activities. We have also suggested how endogeneity in new firms’ perceptions of 
competitors in their niche may account for the negative sign on the number of 
competitors in the innovation equation.  
 
Turning to policy implications, our findings strongly reinforce the message 
that unchallenged monopoly is a drain on dynamism. It is certainly more important to 
ensure that monopolists face at least some challenge than to try refereeing the 
necessarily confused process of rivalry among the few. It is true that at the same time 
as the importance of competition is becoming more apparent, so are the difficulties in 
the way of bringing about such a process effectively, especially in countries trying to 
establish market systems from scratch (see Fingleton, Fox, Neven & Seabright, 1996). 
But our results help to illuminate the ingredients needed for the competitive process to 
work. Not only must there be a market structure in which firms face rivalry but also: 
removal of the obstacles facing new entrants and financial systems that can support 
major investments in restructuring.  
 
Finally, our results strongly support the value of using measures of market 
power that correspond to the perceptions of individual firms as to the competitive 
pressures they face. These are an important supplement to more conventional 
measures, such as shares of markets based on conventional industrial classifications. 
These can help not just in illuminating the overall pressures faced by firms but also 
the way in which different constraints on managerial decision-making interact. 
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Data Appendix: Survey method 
 
The survey instrument was developed by the staff of the EBRD and World Bank and 
the authors of this paper. The 1996 survey by Brunetti et al.on behalf of the World 
Bank provided a basis for this instrument. The sampling frame was designed to be 
broadly representative of the population of the firms according to their economic 
significance, sector, size and geographical location within each country. The sectoral 
composition of the total sample in each country in terms of industry versus services 
was determined by their relative contribution to GDP after allowing for certain 
excluded sectors. Firms that operated in sectors subject to government price 
regulation and prudential supervisions, such as banking, electric power, rail transport, 
water and wastewater were excluded from the sample.  
 
Enterprises eligible for the 1999 BEEPS were therefore in the following 
sectors: 
 
     Industry 
1. Agriculture, hunting and forestry (ISIC Sections A: 1 – 2, B: 5) 
2. Mining and quarrying (ISIC Section C: 10 – 14) 
3. Construction (ISIC Section F: 45) 
4. Manufacturing (ISIC Section D: 15 – 37) 
 
     Services  
5. Transportation (ISIC Section I: 60 – 62) 
6. Wholesale and retail trade and repairs (ISIC Section G: 50 – 52) 
7. Real estate and business services (ISIC Section K: 70 – 74) 
8. Financial services (ISIC Section J: 67) 
9. Hotels, restaurants and other personal services (ISIC Sections H: 55, I:63 ) 
10. Other community, social and personal services (ISIC Section M:80, N: 85, O: 
91 – 93 and 93) 
 
The International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) codes for each sector are 
reported parenthetically.  
 
Within sectors, the sample was designed to be as representative as possible of the 
population of firms subject to various minimum quotas for the total sample in each 
country. This approach sought to achieve a representative cross-section of firms while 
ensuring sufficient weight in the tails of the distribution of firms for key control 
parameters (size, geographical location, exports, and ownership). The minimum 
quotas of the samples for each country were: 
 
1. At least 15 per cent of the total sample should be small in size (2 to 49 
employees) and 15 per cent large (200 to 9,999 employees) Firms with only 
one employee and 10,000 or more employees were excluded from the 
sample. 
2. At least 15 per cent of the firms should have foreign control and 15 per cent 
state control, where control is defined as an ownership share of more than 50 
per cent. 
3. At least 15 per cent of the firms should be exporters, meaning that at least 20 
per cent of their total sales are from exports. 
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4. At least 15 per cent of the firms should be located in a small city (population 
under 50,000) or countryside.  
 
The BEEPS was implemented in 24 of the 27 countries of Central and Eastern 
Europe and the former Soviet Union. For analytical purposes, the Federation of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina and Republika Srpska are treated separately. The survey was 
not implemented in FR Yugoslavia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan because AC Nielsen 
did not have the capacity to implement the survey in these countries, in some cases 
due to the security situation.  
AC Nielsen implemented the survey on behalf of the EBRD and World Bank and 
was selected through a competitive tendering process. AC Nielsen follows the 
ICC/ESOMAR International Code of Marketing and Social Research Practice 
(www.esomar.org, click on codes and guidelines), including those pertaining to the 
rights of respondents. These rights provide for the confidentiality and anonymity of 
the respondents. The interviewers working on behalf of AC Nielsen assured the 
survey respondents that their identities would not be disclosed to either the sponsoring 
institutions or government authorities and that their anonymity would be protected.  
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Table 1. Number of firms by size, sector and region. 
(In proportion of firm type, %) 
 
  Agricul-
ture 
Manufact-
uring  
Other 
industry 
Retail & 
wholesale 
trade 
Other 
services 
Total 
All firms 441 (11.5) 1157 (30.2) 380 (9.9) 1090 (28.4) 769 (20.0) 3837 (100) 
Micro 40 179 73 520 234 1046 (27.3) 
Small 49 215 96 310 137 843 (22.0) 
Medium 155 383 142 191 214 1085 (28.3) 
Full 
sample 
Large 197 380 69 69 148 863 (22.5) 
CEB 58 (4.9) 319 (27.2) 93 (7.9) 364 (31.0) 341 (29.0) 1175 (100) 
SEE 26 (3.1) 346 (41.7) 72 (8.7) 226 (27.2) 160 (19.3) 830 (100) 
Russia 125 (22.8) 139 (25.3) 66 (12.0) 165 (30.1) 54 (9.8) 549 (100) 
Western CIS 57 (15.3) 120 (32.2) 47 (12.6) 105 (28.2) 44 (11.8) 373 (100) 
Southern CIS 72 (14.0) 125 (24.4) 52 (10.1) 173 (33.7) 91 (17.7) 513 (100) 
Central Asia 103 (25.9) 108 (27.2) 50 (12.6) 57 (14.4) 79 (19.9) 397 (100) 
 
Note. Micro firms (employment < 10); small firms (employment 10-49); medium firms (50-199), large 
(>200). “Other industry” comprises mining, construction and electricity; “other services” comprises 
transport, financial, personal, business and miscellaneous services. CEB=Central Europe & Baltics, 
SEE= South-Eastern Europe.  
 
 
Table 2. Real sales and productivity growth and restructuring/innovation by 
ownership of firm 
Mean of log 3-year real sales and productivity growth 
 
Old firms  
SOE Privatized 
New firms All firms 
Number of firms  
(in proportion of firm type, %) 
603 
(15.7) 
1240 
(32.3) 
1994 
(52.0) 
3837 
(100) 
Sales growth (%) -0.9 -2.5 6.5 2.4 
Increase in sales 38.1 42.4 47.3 44.4 
Zero growth 28.9 20.7 23.1 23.2 
Decline in sales  32.3 36.9 32.4 32.4 
Number of 
firms, in 
proportion of 
firm type (%)  100 100 100 100 
Productivity growth (%) 8.6 8.8 -2.4 3.0 
Firms undertaking various types of restructuring activity: 
Opening of new plant 15.8 23.0 19.0 19.8 
New product line 26.9 32.0 20.0 29.7 
Upgrade 41.0 37.7 36.9 37.8 
ISO 16.9 21.3 10.2 14.8 
 
Note: The question asked was, “By what percentage have your sales changed in real terms over the last 
three years?” “Productivity” growth is calculated from the change in sales and in employment reported 
over the last three years. All restructuring indicators refer to changes in the previous three years. “New 
product line” refers to the successful development of a major new product line. “Upgrade” refers to the 
upgrading of an existing product line. “ISO” refers to the receipt of an ISO9000 accreditation. 
 
 28
Table 3. Competition and concentration 
Market power (10% test, answer from 1 - all customers switch - to 4 - customers continue to buy as 
before) and price-cost margin, by ownership and number of competitors 
 
  
Number of competitors 
 
 None 1 to 3 >3 Total 
State-owned Enterprises     
Number of firms  
(in proportion of firm type, %) 
154 
(25.5) 
108 
(17.9) 
341 
(56.6) 603 
% price-cost margin 15.3 12.1 16.0 15.1 
10% test (answer from 1 to 4) 3.08 2.48 2.25 2.50 
Privatized firms     
Number of firms  
(in proportion of firm type, %) 
96 
(7.7) 
160 
(12.9) 
984 
(79.4) 1240 
% price-cost margin 18.3 15.4 15.4 15.6 
10% test (answer from 1 to 4) 2.65 2.38 2.13 2.20 
New firms     
Number of firms  
(in proportion of firm type, %) 
97 
(4.9) 
236 
(11.8) 
1661 
(83.3) 1994 
% price-cost margin 22.7 20.5 17.4 18.0 
10% test (answer from 1 to 4) 2.42 2.39 2.25 2.50 
All firms     
Number of firms  
(in proportion of all firms, %) 
347 
(9.0) 
504 
(13.1) 
2986 
(77.8) 3837 
% price-cost margin 18.3 17.0 16.6 16.7 
10% test (answer from 1 to 4) 2.78 2.40 2.07 2.18 
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Table 4. Reduced form growth regressions  
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable Real sales 
growth  
Real sales 
growth  
Real sales 
growth 
Estimation method OLS GMM OLS 
Employment growth  NO 0.923** 
(0.157) 
Coeff of 1 
imposed 
Number of competitors 
1-3 competitors 
 
>3 competitors 
 
 
0.099** 
(0.034) 
0.032 
(0.027) 
 
0.101** 
(0.032) 
0.044+ 
(0.027) 
 
0.108** 
(0.034) 
0.052 
(0.029) 
Tests of number of competitors vs. 0 vs. > 3 vs. 0 vs. > 3 vs. 0 vs. > 3 
1-3 vs. zero 1-3 vs. > 3 ** ** ** * ** * 
Market power (10% test) 
Sales would fall a lot 
 
Sales would fall slightly 
 
No change in sales 
 
 
0.038+ 
(0.022) 
0.126** 
(0.022) 
0.135** 
(0.026) 
 
0.017 
(0.019) 
0.073** 
(0.019) 
0.051* 
(0.026) 
 
0.019 
(0.020) 
0.080** 
(0.020) 
0.053* 
(0.024) 
Pressure from foreign competitors 0.023** 
(0.008) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
0.009 
(0.007) 
Pressure from customers 0.017+ 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
0.006 
(0.009) 
New firm 
 
0.179** 
(0.021) 
-0.046 
(0.041) 
-0.062** 
(0.019) 
Services 
 
0.023 
(0.019) 
-0.023 
(0.018) 
-0.027 
(0.017) 
Agriculture (0.030) 
(0.028) 
0.013 
(0.025) 
0.017 
(0.026) 
Big city 
 
0.055** 
(0.019) 
0.004 
(0.018) 
-0.005 
(0.017) 
Size (log employment) 0.038** 
(0.007) 
0.018** 
(0.006) 
0.015** 
(0.006) 
Number of observations 3288 3288 3288 
 
Notes: 
+  = sig. at 10%, *   = sig. at 5%; ** = sig. at 1%;  heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in ().  
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Table 5. Determinants of innovation  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Innovation Innovation Innovation 
(old firms) 
Innovation 
(new firms) 
No. of competitors 
1-3 competitors 
 
>3 competitors 
 
0.144+ 
(0.087) 
-0.033 
(0.073) 
 
0.145+ 
(0.087) 
-0.030 
(0.073) 
 
0.202+ 
(0.108) 
0.104 
(0.089) 
 
-0.062 
(0.141) 
-0.343** 
(0.124) 
Tests of number of 
competitors 
vs. 0 vs. > 3 vs. 0 vs. > 3 vs. 0 vs. > 3 vs. 0 vs. > 3 
1-3 vs. zero 1-3 vs. > 3 + ** + ** + 0 0 ** 
Market power (10% test) 
Sales would fall a lot 
 
Sales would fall slightly 
 
No change in sales 
 
0.143** 
(0.051) 
0.272** 
(0.053) 
0.236** 
(0.067) 
 
0.142** 
(0.051) 
0.279** 
(0.053) 
0.232** 
(0.067) 
 
0.163* 
(0.074) 
0.211** 
(0.077) 
0.251** 
(0.090) 
 
0.118+ 
(0.069) 
0.382** 
(0.073) 
0.259** 
(0.102) 
Foreign competitors      
Categorical 
Slightly important 
 
Fairly important 
 
Very important 
 
0.233** 
(0.058) 
0.166** 
(0.056) 
0.335** 
(0.063) 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Coded 1 to 4 (cardinal)  0.101** 
(0.019) 
0.137** 
(0.027) 
0.081** 
(0.027) 
Customers     
Categorical 
Slightly important 
 
Fairly important 
 
Very important 
 
0.131* 
(0.062) 
0.189** 
(0.061) 
0.296** 
(0.068) 
   
Coded 1 to 4 (cardinal)  0.095** 
(0.021) 
0.094** 
(0.031) 
0.089** 
(0.029) 
Size (log employment) 0.106** 
(0.016) 
0.106** 
(0.016) 
0.111** 
(0.022) 
0.115** 
(0.023) 
New firm 
 
0.219** 
(0.050) 
0.225** 
(0.050) 
  
Services 
 
-0.456** 
(0.045) 
-0.462** 
(0.045) 
-0.374** 
(0.067) 
-0.497** 
(0.061) 
Agriculture -0.497** 
(0.070) 
-0.496** 
(0.071) 
-0.571** 
(0.086) 
-0.163 
(0.130) 
Big city 
 
0.134** 
(0.045) 
0.134** 
(0.045) 
0.219** 
(0.066) 
0.064 
(0.059) 
Number of observations 3448 3448 1678 1770 
 
Notes: 
= + sig. at 10%, *   = sig. at 5%; ** = sig. at 1%;  heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in ().  
Test of (1) vs. (2):  χ2(4)=8.35, p-value=0.08.
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 Table 6. Determinants of sales growth, employment growth treated as exogenous 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Real sales growth Real sales growth Real sales growth 
(old firms) 
Real sales growth
(new firms) 
Estimation method OLS GMM  GMM  GMM  
Employment growth  0.602** 
(0.028) 
0.530** 
(0.036) 
0.439** 
(0.046) 
0.619** 
(0.055) 
Innovation 0.052** 
(0.007) 
0.181** 
(0.038) 
0.192** 
(0.042) 
0.121+ 
(0.064) 
Number of competitors 
1-3 competitors 
 
>3 competitors 
 
 
0.100** 
(0.030) 
0.041 
(0.025) 
 
0.081** 
(0.032) 
0.045 
(0.027) 
 
0.047 
(0.037) 
0.001 
(0.032) 
 
0.149** 
(0.057) 
0.104+ 
(0.054) 
Tests of number of 
competitors 
vs. 0 vs. > 3 vs. 0 vs. > 3 vs. 0 vs. > 3 vs. 0 vs. > 3 
1-3 vs. zero 1-3 vs. > 3 ** ** ** 0 ** 0 ** 0 
Market power (10% test) 
Sales would fall a lot 
 
Sales would fall slightly 
 
No change in sales 
 
 
0.019 
(0.019) 
0.087** 
(0.018) 
0.072** 
(0.022) 
 
0.003 
(0.021) 
0.056** 
(0.021) 
0.051* 
(0.024) 
 
-0.008 
(0.028) 
0.061* 
(0.026) 
0.068* 
(0.031) 
 
0.018 
(0.029) 
0.057 
(0.036) 
0.025 
(0.036) 
New firm 
 
-0.008 
(0.016) 
0.002 
(0.017) 
  
Services 
 
0.001 
(0.016) 
0.076* 
(0.027) 
0.109** 
(0.032) 
0.021 
(0.041) 
Agriculture 0.049* 
(0.024) 
0.113** 
(0.032) 
0.123** 
(0.041) 
0.076 
(0.040) 
Big city 
 
0.015 
(0.016) 
-0.002 
(0.018) 
-0.026 
(0.026) 
0.021 
(0.022) 
Excluded instruments n.a. Pressure to 
innovate, size 
Pressure to 
innovate, size 
Pressure to 
innovate, size 
First-stage F-test of 
excluded instruments 
 F(3,3250)=33.2 F(3,1573)=26.0 F(3,1636)=11.2 
Test of overidentifying 
restrictions (Hansen J) 
n.a. χ2(2)=1.80 
p-value=0.41 
χ2(2)=1.10 
p-value=0.58 
χ2(2)=0.41 
p-value=0.82 
Number of observations 3288 3288 1615 1673 
 
Notes: 
= + sig. at 10%, *   = sig. at 5%; ** = sig. at 1%.  
Standard errors and test statistics are heteroskedastic-robust.
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Table 7.  Determinants of sales growth, imposed labour elasticity  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable 
Sales growth with 
imposed labour elasticity 
of: 
1 0.75 0.5 0.25 
Estimation method GMM  GMM  GMM  GMM  
Innovation 0.104** 
(0.035) 
0.145** 
(0.034) 
0.187** 
(0.035) 
0.228** 
(0.037) 
Number of competitors 
1-3 competitors 
 
>3 competitors 
 
 
0.096** 
(0.034) 
0.054 
(0.029) 
 
0.088** 
(0.032) 
0.050 
(0.027) 
 
0.080** 
(0.032) 
0.045 
(0.027) 
 
0.072* 
(0.033) 
0.040 
(0.028) 
Tests of number of 
competitors 
vs. 0 vs. > 3 vs. 0 vs. > 3 vs. 0 vs. > 3 vs. 0 vs. > 3 
1-3 vs. zero 1-3 vs. > 3 ** + ** + ** 0 ** 0 
Market power (10% test) 
Sales would fall a lot 
 
Sales would fall slightly 
 
No change in sales 
 
 
0.005 
(0.021) 
0.054** 
(0.021) 
0.029 
(0.025) 
 
0.003 
(0.020) 
0.055** 
(0.021) 
0.041 
(0.024) 
 
0.002 
(0.021) 
0.056** 
(0.021) 
0.052* 
(0.024) 
 
0.002 
(0.022) 
0.056** 
(0.023) 
0.063** 
(0.026) 
New firm 
 
-0.091** 
(0.016) 
-0.042** 
(0.015) 
0.007 
(0.016) 
0.056** 
(0.017) 
Services 
 
0.019 
(0.024) 
0.050* 
(0.024) 
0.080** 
(0.025) 
0.111** 
(0.028) 
Agriculture 0.069* 
(0.032) 
0.093** 
(0.031) 
0.116** 
(0.031) 
0.139** 
(0.032) 
Big city 
 
-0.020 
(0.018) 
-0.010 
(0.018) 
-0.001 
(0.018) 
0.008 
(0.019) 
Country dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Excluded instruments Pressure to 
innovate, size 
Pressure to 
innovate, size 
Pressure to 
innovate, size 
Pressure to 
innovate, size 
Test of overidentifying 
restrictions (Hansen J) 
χ2(2)=0.57 
p-value=0.75 
χ2(2)=1.19 
p-value=0.55 
χ2(2)=1.87 
p-value=0.39 
χ2(2)=2.41 
p-value=0.30 
 
Notes: 
*   = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%; heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in (); number of 
observations=3288. 
First-stage regression statistic (all equations): heteroskedastic-robust F(3,3251)=38.7. 
Heteroskedasticity-robust endogeneity tests: (1) vs. (2), χ2(2)=19.8, p-value=0.00, OLS rejected;  (1) 
vs. (4), χ2(1)=14.2, p-value=0.00, OLS rejected. 
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Table 8. Determinants of innovation  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable Innovation Innovation Innovation Innovation 
No. of competitors 
1-3 competitors 
 
>3 competitors 
 
0.154+ 
(0.087) 
-0.019 
(0.073) 
 
0.117 
(0.086) 
-0.083 
(0.071) 
 
 
 
-0.211 
(0.222) 
-0.344+ 
(0.188) 
Tests of number of competitors vs. 0 vs. > 3 vs. 0 vs. > 3
1-3 vs. zero 1-3 vs. > 3 + ** 0 ** 
  
Market power (10% test)   
Coded 1-4 (cardinal) 
0.099** 
(0.020) 
 
 
0.103** 
(0.020) 
 
Market power 
With no competitors 
 
With 1-3 competitors 
 
With > competitors 
    
-0.012 
(0.061) 
0.123* 
(0.052) 
0.108** 
(0.022) 
Foreign competitors 
Coded 1-4 (cardinal) 
0.102** 
(0.019) 
0.093** 
(0.019) 
0.101** 
(0.019) 
0.100** 
(0.019) 
Customers 
Coded 1-4 (cardinal) 
0.096** 
(0.022) 
0.091** 
(0.022) 
0.097** 
(0.022) 
0.097** 
(0.021) 
Size (log employment) 0.107** 
(0.016) 
0.110** 
(0.016) 
0.111** 
(0.016) 
0.107** 
(0.159) 
New firm 
 
0.228** 
(0.050) 
0.227** 
(0.050) 
0.231** 
(0.050) 
0.225** 
(0.050) 
Services 
 
-0.460** 
(0.045) 
-0.459** 
(0.045) 
-0.466** 
(0.045) 
-0.458** 
(0.045) 
Agriculture -0.501** 
(0.071) 
-0.486** 
(0.071) 
-0.513** 
(0.071) 
-0.502** 
(0.071) 
Big city 
 
0.135** 
(0.045) 
0.144** 
(0.045) 
0.133** 
(0.044) 
0.137** 
(0.045) 
Number of observations 3448 3448 3448 3448 
 
Notes: 
+  = sig. at 10%, *   = sig. at 5%; ** = sig. at 1%;  heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in ().  
 
 
